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Center for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89355, 2017 WL 2438327 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2017)
Lowell J. Chandler
The ESA protects threatened or endangered species, and species
likely to become threatened or endangered within the foreseeable future,
throughout all or a significant portion of their range. In Center for
Biological Diversity v. Jewell, the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona overturned a Fish and Wildlife Service policy defining
the significant portion of range language in the ESA. The policy
interpretation limited ESA protections to apply only when a species faced
risk of extinction throughout its entire range. The court deemed this policy
impermissible because it effectively rendered the significant portion of
range language meaningless. The court held that the Service’s significant
portion of range policy was contrary to the conservation goals of the ESA
and that the Service’s 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule was invalid, resulting
in violations of the ESA and the APA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Center for Biological Diversity and Defenders of Wildlife
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) challenged two separate actions by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”), claiming violations of the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”).1 Plaintiffs first challenged the Service’s interpretation of the
phrase “significant portion of its range” (“SPR”) under the ESA’s
definition of endangered or threatened species. 2 Plaintiffs claimed that the
Service’s final policy defining SPR (“2014 Final SPR Policy”) was an
improper interpretation of the ESA’s SPR language.3 Plaintiffs argued that
the interpretation undermined the ESA’s conservation objectives by
limiting the definition of SPR to the point that it was unavailing.4 Second,
Plaintiffs challenged the Service’s rejection of their petition to list the
cactus ferruginous pygmy owl (“pygmy owl”) as an endangered or
threatened species under the ESA in its 2011 final 12-month finding on
the pygmy owl (“2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule”).5 Plaintiffs claimed that
by relying on an improper interpretation of SPR in its 2011 Final Pygmy
Owl Rule, the Service violated the ESA and the APA. 6
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The court
found that the Service’s 2014 Final SPR Policy was a violation of the ESA
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Center for Biological Diversity v. Jewell, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 89355, 2017 WL 2438327, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2017).
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *1.
Id.
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and APA because it rendered the SPR language of the ESA
“meaningless.” 7 Under the court’s ruling, a species that is imperiled in a
significant portion of its range, regardless of the risk posed to the entire
species, will be eligible for ESA protection throughout not only the SPR
where it is threatened, but its entire range. Additionally, the court ordered
the Service to reconsider its finding in its 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule
because it applied an impermissible interpretation of SPR.8
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Under the ESA, SPR is used in both the definitions of endangered
species and threatened species.9 A species is considered endangered if it
“is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range.”10 A species is determined to be threatened if it “is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of its range.” 11 While the SPR language is integral to
ESA listing determinations, the ESA fails to define its meaning. 12 Due to
this failure, the phrase is defined by the Service through administrative
rulemaking. 13 Due to the Service’s frequently changing definition of SPR,
the Ninth Circuit has characterized the phrase as “inherently
ambiguous.” 14 During the four years (2007 to 2011) between Plaintiffs
filing their petition to list the pygmy owl and the Service’s issuance of the
final pygmy owl rule, the Service’s SPR definition changed several
times.15
In response to a Ninth Circuit decision that found a prior Service
definition of SPR impermissible, the Solicitor of the Department of
Interior issued a Memorandum Opinion (“2007 M-Opinion”) analyzing
the SPR in March 2007. 16 The Service then issued a Draft Guidance
document (“2007 Draft Guidance”) interpreting SPR as areas that
“contribute meaningfully to the conservation of a listable entity based on
its contribution to the resiliency, redundancy, and representation of the
entity.” 17 This interpretation effectively allowed for a species at risk in a
SPR to be listed under the ESA only in that SPR, not its entire range.18
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a petition to list the pygmy owl as an
endangered or threatened species in the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion.19
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at *8-9.
Id.
Id. at *1 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (2017)).
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)).
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir.
2001)).
Id. at *3-6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *4.
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In response, the Service issued a draft 12-month finding on the
pygmy owl (“2009 Draft Pygmy Owl Rule”) in July 2009, concluding the
“listing of the pygmy owl within a significant portion of its range, namely
the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion, was warranted under the ESA . . . .”20 The
Service reached this conclusion by applying the SPR interpretation from
the 2007 Draft Guidance and adding language to its definition of SPR that
stated “such that [the portion of range] los[t] ‘would result in a decrease in
the ability to conserve the species.’”21
However, in 2011, as a result of two 2010 court decisions that
rejected the 2007 M-Opinion’s conclusion that an imperiled species
should only be listed in the SPR where it faces threats, the Service
developed a new SPR draft interpretation.22 In December 2011, the
Service published a notice of its Draft SPR Policy (“2011 Draft SPR
Policy”), which concluded that a portion of range is only significant “if its
contribution to the viability of the species is so important that, without that
portion, the species would be in danger of extinction.”23 The Service
declared that until the 2011 Draft SPR Policy was finalized and published,
it would be “nonbinding guidance in making individual listing
determinations . . . .”24
Two months prior to the publication of the December 2011 Draft
SPR Policy, the Service issued its 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule,
concluding that listing the species was unwarranted.25 The Service relied
on the unpublished 2011 Draft SPR Policy, not the 2007 Draft Guidance
interpretation used in the 2009 Draft Pygmy Owl Rule, which determined
that listing was warranted.26 In the 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule, the
Service acknowledged that the Sonoran Desert Ecoregion “represents an
important portion” of range; however, they concluded since the pygmy
owl could survive elsewhere, the ecoregion was not an SPR. 27 In July
2014, the Service published its 2014 Final SPR Policy.28 The 2014 Final
SPR Policy established that a portion of range is significant if “the species
is not currently endangered or threatened throughout [all] its range, but the
portion's contribution. . . is so important that, without the [portions]
members. . . the species would be in danger of extinction, or likely to
become so in the foreseeable future, throughout all of its range.” 29
III. ANALYSIS
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *5 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.
Mont. 2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105253, 2010 WL 3895682 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *6.
29. Id.
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The court reviewed the Plaintiff’s challenges under the APA’s
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.30 Because the SPR language is not
defined in the ESA, it is ambiguous.31 Therefore, the court must
“determine the degree of deference owed to the Service's interpretation of
the SPR language.”32
Relying on Chervron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the court applied Chevron deference to the Service’s SPR
language interpretation.33 Under Chevron, an agency’s interpretation is
valid if it is “reasonable.” 34 An agency’s interpretation may be
unreasonable if it “‘ignores the plain language of the statute,’ renders
statutory language ‘superfluous,’ or ‘frustrate[s] the policy Congress
sought to implement’ in the statute.” 35
Following Ninth Circuit precedent, the court found that the
Service’s 2014 Final SPR Policy was unreasonable, and therefore the
policy and the 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule violated the APA and the
ESA.36
A. The Challenge to the Final 2014 SPR Policy
Plaintiffs argued the Service’s interpretation of the ESA’s SPR
language failed to provide “an independent basis for listing [a species],”
as required by the ESA.37 The court agreed, finding that the Service’s 2014
Final SPR Policy was impermissible because it rendered “key statutory
language meaningless and redundant [to] achieve a goal at odds with the
purposes of the statute.” 38
The court found that, under the Service’s 2014 Final SPR Policy,
three conditions needed to be satisfied for a portion of range to qualify as
an SPR:
“(1) the species is neither endangered nor threatened throughout
all of its range, (2) the portion's contribution to the viability of
the species is so important that, without the members in that
portion, the species would be endangered or threatened

30. Id.
31. Id. at *6.
32. Id. at *3, *6 (citing Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
475 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2007)).
33. Id. at *3, 6 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
34. Id. at *3 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-87
(2000)).
35. Id. (quoting Pac. Nw. Generating Coop v. Dep't of Energy, 580 F.3d 792,
806, 812 (9th Cir. 2009)).
36. Id. at *6-8.
37. Id. at *6.
38. Id. at *8 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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throughout all of its range, and (3) the species is endangered or
threatened in that portion of its range.”39
The court concluded it was impossible to satisfy all three conditions
simultaneously because “whenever conditions (2) and (3) [were] satisfied,
a species should properly be determined to be endangered or threatened
throughout all of its range.”40 Further, the court opined that “if a portion
of a species’ range [was] so vital that its loss would render the entire
species endangered or threatened . . . ,” then “[t]hreats . . . in such a vital
portion of its range should necessarily be imputed to the species overall.” 41
The court found the 2014 Final SPR Policy interpretation resulted
in giving “as little substantive effect as possible to the SPR language of
the ESA [to] avoid providing range-wide protection to a species based on
threats in a portion of the species' range.” Therefore, the court ruled that
the 2014 Final SPR Policy violated the ESA and the APA.42
B. The Challenge to the 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule
Plaintiffs also argued that the Service violated the APA in its 2011
Final Pygmy Owl Rule because it applied the 2011 Draft SPR Policy
instead of the 2014 Final SPR Policy.43 On this issue, the court found that
determining deference was irrelevant since the “SPR interpretation set
forth in [the 2011 Draft SPR Policy] suffer[ed] from the same fundamental
defect as the SPR interpretation set forth in the [2014] Final SPR Policy.” 44
Therefore, the court held that because the Service applied an
impermissible interpretation of the SPR language to conclude that the
Sonoran Desert Ecoregion was not a “significant portion of the pygmy
owl's . . . range,” the 2011 Final Pygmy Owl Rule violated the APA and
ESA.45
IV. CONCLUSION
Center for Biological Diversity v. Jewell is a major decision, not
only for the pygmy owl, but for all species that are endangered or
threatened in significant portions of their range. Had the court found the
Service’s 2014 Final SPR Policy valid, it would be difficult to achieve
range-wide ESA protections for a species imperiled in vital portions of
their range, if threats did not lead to a risk of extinction to the entire
species. Now, it is likely that if a species is imperiled in an SPR, the species
will be eligible for ESA protection throughout its entire range, not only the
SPR area. The court’s holding is an important decision in the ongoing

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
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debate over a proper SPR definition, and will provide persuasive precedent
in anticipated future disputes.

